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Abstract 
This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. Over time, members’ 
benefits from being in a federation can fluctuate because of changes in the state of the world. If a 
member stops benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on a real options 
model, we show that state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions. In 
addition to the substantive implications, this represents a methodological contribution to real 
options theory. Even if ex-ante specified exit penalties cannot be made state-contingent, they may 
still enhance social welfare by preventing secession wars. This finding runs counter to the dominant 
view in the literature that exit clauses should be avoided in federations. As a first test of the model, 
we derive five hypotheses and show that they hold for the breakup of Yugoslavia and all cases 
known to us of federations with an exit clause. 
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This article develops a political economic model of secession and the potential role of exit 
clauses. Generally speaking, an exit clause specifies the conditions of exit or withdrawal from an 
agreement. Examples of exit clause conditions are the payment of a penalty or waiting out a notice 
period. In most types of international treaties, safeguard clauses regulating temporary escape or 
withdrawal clauses regulating permanent exit are relatively prevalent (Koremenos and Nau 2010; 
Rosendorff and Milner 2001). As an alternative way of ensuring flexibility, international 
agreements may be concluded for a limited duration (Koremenos 2005). This is not the case for 
federations, which almost by definition have indefinite durations and in which exit clauses 
regulating secession are relatively rare. To the best of our knowledge, the only current examples 
are the secession clauses in the 1991 constitution of Ethiopia (Habtu 2005) and the 1983 
constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis (Weinstock 2001).3 The European Union (EU), which has 
many characteristics of a federation, also has a withdrawal clause (Athanassiou 2009).4 A historical 
example is Article 72 in the constitution of the Soviet Union (Sunstein, 1991: 645-647): “Each 
Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR”. 
Depending on how a secession takes place, it can be peaceful and swift, or painful and costly 
(Tir et al. 1998; Young 1994). If there is no exit clause in the federal constitution, exit from a 
federation requires an ex-post negotiated solution, i.e. consent from the remaining members. If a 
negotiated exit cannot be reached, embarking on a destructive secession war may be the only 
alternative for a member wishing to secede (Helfer 2005). We analyze three modes of exit: exit 
based on an exit clause, unilateral exit through a secession war, and negotiated exit. Considering 
                                                 
3 The conditions in the Federal Republic Ethiopia include a two-thirds majority in the Parliament of the seceding 
region. Saint Kitts and Nevis allows for secession by Nevis in case a two-thirds majority is reached in an independence 
referendum in Nevis.  
4 Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union specifies that any Member State may withdraw from the Union by 
notifying the Council, and is guaranteed the right to leave unilaterally within two years. 
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the Soviet case, we allow for the possibility that the federation meets the triggering of an exit clause 
with an anti-secession war. Based on a real options model, we show that state-contingent exit 
penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions even if there are barriers to ex-post negotiation. 
In addition to the substantive implications, this is a methodological contribution to real options 
theory. 
This paper is structured as follows. First we introduce the notion of efficient breach and review 
the literature on exit clauses. Then we introduce our model, of which we formally solve a decision 
theoretical version. Based on the insights from this analysis, we discuss the game-theoretical 
aspects of exit. Because a formal game-theoretical model incorporating barriers to negotiated exit 
would not be tractable, we offer a discussion instead. We demonstrate the plausibility of our 
conclusions by showing how the dynamics of the breakup of Yugoslavia can be explained based 
on our theory, and review all cases known to us of exit clauses in federations. While the evidence 
is supportive of the predictions of our model, it is by nature inconclusive in any statistical sense 
due to the small number of cases. In the conclusion, we identify three tentative reasons why exit 
clauses are actually rare in federations, in spite of their potential benefits. 
Efficient breach and the literature on exit clauses 
The idea that not respecting a contract may be socially desirable is known as efficient breach 
(Goetz and Scott 1977). In theory, if exit is efficient those better off outside could offer an 
acceptable side-payment for exit and make everyone better off – an application of Coase (1960). 
In this light, Drèze, De Grauwe, & Edwards (1993) discuss a practical rule suggested by Drèze to 
ex-post reapportion national debt at the time of secession. However, as pointed out by De Grauwe, 
ex-post renegotiation may be very difficult politically. Hence ex-ante negotiated exit clauses may 
be necessary to enable efficient breach. 
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In spite of the potential benefits of secession clauses, the dominant position in the 
constitutionalist literature is that they should be avoided. This position was pioneered by Sunstein 
(1991), who sees constitutions as pre-commitment strategies in the presence of multiple equilibria. 
Chen & Ordeshook (1994) take the same starting point, but develop a formal three-player game-
theoretical model which is taken up further in Filippov, Ordeshook, & Shvetsova (2004). Their 
conclusion is that there should be a constitutional ban on exit, in order to coordinate on non-
secession equilibria, which are assumed to be Pareto superior. 
The strength of the conclusions drawn by Chen & Ordeshook (1994) is limited because of three 
strong assumptions. First, they assume that maintaining the federation is always socially efficient 
(efficient breach does not exist by assumption). Second, they assume that without an exit clause, 
exit cannot occur. In reality a party wishing to exit may embark on a destructive secession war. 
Third, they assume that exit clauses are necessarily unconditional, i.e. free in use. In reality, exit 
will necessarily cause one-off transaction costs, and exit clauses could conceivably stipulate a 
penalty to be paid to the remainder of the federation. 
Bordignon & Brusco (2001) analyze optimal secession rules in a two-player game with two 
periods and a discrete stochastic state. In period two, members of the federation decide between 
accepting a federal allocation or starting a secession war. The conclusion is that secession clauses 
may be inefficient if the benefits from the federation depend significantly on its perceived stability. 
While this model allows for stochastic shocks and hence the possibility of efficient breach, it still 
has some important limitations. The discretized set-up with only two periods and four states of the 
world precludes the analysis of optimal exit timing. In addition, they introduce a new restrictive 
assumption compared to Chen & Ordeshook (1994), namely that countries are ex-ante identical. 
Using a formal model of costly exit clauses, we show that the position of Sunstein (1991) and 
Chen & Ordeshook (1994) against exit clauses is tenuous. By modeling the dynamic aspect of exit 
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decisions in continuous time, we introduce considerations of optimal exit timing absent in 
Bordignon & Brusco (2001). In addition, our model allows for members of the union to be different 
ex-ante, so that the distributional consequences of exit clauses can be studied. We also show that 
appropriately costly exit clauses do not increase the likelihood of exit given the implicit option of 
unilateral exit through a secession war. 
The model 
The following continuous time model describes a political union between two federated entities 
or members indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}.5 For tractability, we assume that the entities of the federation 
are composed of identical inhabitants, and leave the incorporation of within-entity heterogeneity 
for future work. This means that each federal entity can be modeled as a unitary actor. For each 
such entity or member of the federation 𝑖, the net benefits of being in the federation versus outside 
depend on the rules of the federation and a member’s characteristics. Consistent with the literature 
on the size of nations, we assume that the benefits and costs from being part of a federation 
comprise economies of scale in the provision of public goods, the internalization of externalities, 
fiscal transfers, and welfare losses from centralized decision-making in the presence of 
heterogeneity between the federated entities (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Desmet et al. 2011; Hug 
2005). Each of these components is determined by the substantive terms of the federation, such as 
the rules for computing fiscal transfers, and the characteristics of the entities, such as their average 
income. We denote an entity’s net benefits at the time of the creation of the federation by its type, 
𝜃𝑖. A high type indicates high benefits from the union. Forcefully incorporated members of the 
federation may have a negative type. 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the importance of administrative divisions of states, see Griffiths (2015). 
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Over time a member’s benefits from being in the federation versus outside may change because 
of changes in the state of the world. For instance, a member may become richer. While this may 
be good for the member per se, it may also decrease its benefits from the federation, because it will 
have to pay higher fiscal transfers. This may be the case for Catalonia in Spain and Flanders in 
Belgium. As another example, consider changes in heterogeneity: over time, the culture and 
preferences of people across the federated entities may converge (diverge) such that the benefits of 
the federation for each federated entity increase (decrease). As a third example, two key external 
parameters can decrease the benefits from economies of scale: free trade and peace (Alesina and 
Spolaore 2003). With more free trade outside of the union the economies of scale from having a 
large internal market become less important. Likewise, the lower external military threats, the less 
important the economies of scale in the provision of national defense. Finally, consider changes in 
the attractiveness of the outside option, such as through the emergence of a free trade bloc like the 
European Union. 
In our model, we capture all changes in the state of the world that are relevant for a member’s 
benefits of being in the federation versus outside by its state 𝑥𝑖. A high state means that a member 
is currently enjoying the federation more than when it was created, and vice versa. We assume that 
the link between the state of the world and benefit flows is exogenous. Substantively, this 
assumption means that the terms of the union cannot be renegotiated, e.g. the rules for computing 
fiscal transfers cannot be changed. While this is a limitation, we leave for future work a model 
where the link between the state of the world and benefits is endogenous. 
To summarize, the net benefits for both members from being in the union versus outside depend 
on the stochastic state of the world at time 𝑡, 𝑥(𝑡) = (𝑥𝐴(𝑡), 𝑥𝐵(𝑡)), and on the members’ types 
(𝜃𝐴, 𝜃𝐵). Concretely, member 𝑖’s net benefit flow 𝜋𝑖(𝑡) at time 𝑡 is given by: 
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𝜋𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) + 𝜃𝑖 (1) 
The state of the world captures the changes in benefits over time, which are uncertain. For 
simplicity, assume that member 𝑖’s state 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) evolves according to a Brownian motion without 
drift and with variance 𝜎𝑖
2. A Brownian motion is a mathematical representation of a random 
process over time. Over any given time period 𝑑𝑡, it can go up or down. The increments 𝑑𝑥𝑖 have 
a normal distribution characterized by variance 𝜎𝑖
2 (Mörters and Peres 2010). A higher variance 𝜎𝑖
2 
means that member 𝑖’s benefits are expected to fluctuate more. Formally, a Brownian motion is 
characterized by 
𝑑𝑥𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖𝜖𝑖𝑡√𝑑𝑡 (2) 
where 𝜖𝑖𝑡 has a standard normal distribution and is serially uncorrelated so that for all 𝑡 > 0 
𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡] = 0, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡
2 ] = 1, 𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡1𝜖𝑖𝑡2] = 0, 𝑡1 ≠ 𝑡2 (3) 
This implies that 𝐸[𝑑𝑥𝑖] = 0 and 𝐸[(𝑑𝑥𝑖)
2] = 𝜎𝑖
2𝑑𝑡: benefits are expected to remain the same, 
but have a variance of 𝜎𝑖
2 per unit of time. 
Assume furthermore that the increments 𝜖𝐴𝑡 and 𝜖𝐵𝑡 of the Brownian motions 𝑥𝐴(𝑡) and 𝑥𝐵(𝑡) 
are jointly normally distributed for all 𝑡, with correlation 𝜌 so that 
𝐸[𝜖𝐴𝑡𝜖𝐵𝑡] = 𝜌, 𝐸[𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑑𝑥𝐵] = 𝜌𝜎𝐴𝜎𝐵𝑑𝑡  (4) 
A positive correlation means that both members’ benefits tend to move together. A negative 
correlation means that changes in the state of the world tend to have an opposite effect on both 
members.  
Without loss of generality, suppose that the union starts at 𝑡 = 0 and set 𝑥𝑖(0) = 0. Since we 
have assumed no drift in the states 𝑥𝑖, their ex ante expected value is 0 for any future date 𝑇; 
mathematically, 𝐸[𝑥𝑖(𝑇)] = 0, ∀𝑇 > 0. Similarly, the expected value at time 𝑡 for a later time 𝑇 is 
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simply the value at the time of the expectation: 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑖(𝑇)] = 𝑥𝑖(𝑡). At time 𝑡 the probability density 
for time 𝑇 at state 𝑥𝑖 is 
𝑃𝑡(𝑥𝑖(𝑇) = 𝑥𝑖) = 𝜙(𝑥𝑖; 𝑥𝑖(𝑡), 𝜎𝑖
2(𝑇 − 𝑡)) = 𝜙 (
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖(𝑡)
𝜎𝑖√𝑇 − 𝑡
) (5) 
where 𝜙(𝑥; 𝜇, 𝜎2) is the probability density function (pdf) of the normal distribution with mean 
𝜇 and variance 𝜎2, and 𝜙(𝑥) is the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Substantively, this 
means that the expected change in 𝑥𝑖 over any time period 𝑇 − 𝑡 is zero and that large changes are 
less likely than small changes. However, since the variance increases linearly with the time period 
𝑇 − 𝑡 the expected magnitude of changes increases with time. 
Assume that the members have a common discount rate 𝑟, so that the expected discounted 
benefit from the union for member 𝑖 until time 𝑇 is 𝐸 [∫ 𝜋𝑖(𝑡)𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
]. The ex-ante expected value 
for member 𝑖 from a perpetual union is 
𝐸 [∫ 𝜋𝑖(𝑡)𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
+∞
0
] =  lim
𝑇→+∞
(
𝜃𝑖
𝑟
−
𝜃𝑖
𝑟
𝑒−𝑟𝑇) =
𝜃𝑖
𝑟
 (6) 
Hence, member 𝑖 only voluntarily enters the union if its type 𝜃𝑖 > 0. Members with 𝜃𝑖 < 0 
may be coerced to join the union, but clearly such members want to secede from the federation if 
the exit costs are not prohibitive. Even if the union is ex ante beneficial for all, in some states of 
the world 𝑥(𝑡) it may turn out so bad for one or both members that they may wish to exit. 
In the model, we consider two types of ex-ante fixed exit conditions: penalties and one-off 
costs. An exit penalty consists of the payment of an amount 𝑐𝑖 by the exiting party 𝑖 to the remaining 
party 𝑗. All other costs associated with exit are grouped in the one-off costs 𝑘𝑖 . This parameter 
comprises all non-transfer costs required explicitly or implicitly by the exit clause, such as the costs 
of organizing a referendum (if required), and the legal costs of creating a new state. The costs 𝑐𝑖 
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and 𝑘𝑖 have the same effect on party 𝑖, but only 𝑐𝑖 will be received by 𝑗 as a compensation for exit. 
While 𝑘𝑖 is partly endogenous, 𝑐𝑖 can be freely specified. 
As an example, consider the EU’s Article 50. This clause does not specify a penalty, although 
it does stipulate a waiting period of two years. An example of a penalty that could have been 
included would be the payment of an additional year’s budget contribution. The clause does not 
specify one-off costs such as the organization of a referendum, but clearly exit from the EU requires 
a substantial amount of legal costs. As an important side note, by triggering Article 50 a Member 
State can only guarantee full departure from the EU. This means losing all of the associated 
benefits, such a access to the Single Market, and all of the costs, such as the budget contribution. 
The leaving state may attempt to negotiate more favorable terms with the rest of the EU, but such 
negotiations are legally distinct from the exit. 
Optimal exit in a decision theoretical setting 
To analyze the consequences of exit clauses, this section formally solves a decision-theoretical 
version of the model, in which only one member can exit. We start below by situating our model 
in real options theory. Following this, the first subsection discusses optimal exit with a fixed 
penalty 𝑐, assuming that any clause is fully binding. In the second subsection the possibility of a 
secession war is incorporated. The next three subsections address the uncertainty of exit costs, the 
consequences of exit for the rest of the union, and the possibility of an anti-secession war initiated 
by the rump of the federation. The sixth subsection derives conditions for socially efficient exit, 
and the seventh and final subsection shows that state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially 
efficient exit. 
In the model, we treat exit clauses as so-called real options. The theory of options was initially 
developed to study financial instruments such as put options, which give the holder a right to sell 
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a stock at a pre-determined price in the future. Once developed, this theory has also been leveraged 
to study other optional decisions, such as the option to acquire a Joint Venture (Kogut 1991). Such 
applications of options theory outside of financial applications are called real options theory. The 
main technique used is dynamic stochastic programming, which requires the use of stochastic 
differential equations (Øksendal 1991; Stokey 2008). Our model builds on Dixit (1989) and Dixit 
& Pindyck (1994), who study firms’ decisions to enter and exit markets with changing output 
prices. Since output prices are normally positive, they focus on geometric Brownian motions. In 
contrast, the model presented here assumes a standard Brownian motion because the benefits from 
a federation can become negative. 
Our methodological contribution to real options theory is twofold. First, we extend the basic 
model of exit by a firm from a market to exit by a member from a federation. Unlike in a market, 
exit by one member of a federation implies a loss of benefits for the other members. Second, we 
formalize the mathematics of state-contingent exit penalties which depend on the state of the other 
member in a union. Jointly, these two methodological contributions allow us to derive conditions 
for socially efficient exit from a federation. 
In what follows, we assume for simplicity that exit is definitive and that there is no possibility 
of re-entering later. However, even if re-entry is free the qualitative conclusions from our model 
would still hold, but the solution process would be complicated as the optimal exit decisions and 
optimal entry decisions would be mutually interdependent. 
In the decision-theoretical version of the model, we assume that only one member can exit from 
the union, and only consider that member. Hence for now we drop the index 𝑖 to lighten notation. 
When thinking about exit in a continuous time set-up, a member compares the expected value of 
maintaining the union to the value of exiting right now. Assuming rationality, the expected value 
of maintaining the union right now should take as a given optimal exit behavior in the future. This 
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is captured by the notion of continuation value: the continuation value 𝑉(𝑥) is the expected 
discounted benefit from maintaining the union when the current state is 𝑥, assuming optimal exit 
behavior in the future (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
We show in the Appendix that the continuation value is composed of two parts: the expected 
perpetuity value from maintaining the union, plus the option value of being able to terminate the 
union. At state 𝑥, the benefit flow is 𝑥 + 𝜃. Since on average the future value of a Brownian motion 
is equal to the current value, the expected perpetuity value at state 𝑥 is 
𝑥+𝜃
𝑟
. The more important 
the future, the lower the discount rate 𝑟 and the higher the perpetuity value. As we show in the 
Appendix, the option value of terminating the union depends on the exit terms. Specifically, the 
option value is 𝐵𝑒𝛽𝑥, with 𝛽 = −√
2𝑟
𝜎2
 and 𝐵 a constant to be determined. Combining the expected 
perpetuity value and the option value, the continuation value can be written as 
𝑉(𝑥) =
𝑥 + 𝜃
𝑟
+ 𝐵𝑒𝛽𝑥 , 𝛽 = −√
2𝑟
𝜎2
 (7) 
Optimal exit with an exit penalty 𝑐 
The continuation value is the value of maintaining the union for now, assuming optimal 
behavior for the future. Hence the constant 𝐵 depends on the optimal exit state 𝑥𝑒. In the Appendix, 
we show that when facing an exit penalty 𝑐, the optimal exit state and the corresponding value for 
𝐵 are 
𝑥𝑒 = −𝜃 − 𝑟(𝑘 + 𝑐) +
1
𝛽
, 𝐵 = −
𝑒−𝛽𝑥
𝑒
𝑟𝛽
 (8) 
The optimal exit state consists of three components. The first one, −𝜃, is the most intuitive. 
When 𝑥 reaches – 𝜃, the benefit flow drops to zero: 𝜋(𝑡|𝑥(𝑡) = −𝜃) = −𝜃 + 𝜃 = 0. The higher a 
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member’s type 𝜃, the longer it is optimal to stay in the union, i.e. the more negative the optimal 
exit state.: 
𝜕𝑥𝑒
𝜕𝜃
< 0. The second term, −𝑟(𝑘 + 𝑐), reflects the deterring effect of exit costs since 
𝜕𝑥𝑒
𝜕𝑘
=
𝜕𝑥𝑒
𝜕𝑐
< 0. The benefit flow needs to drop to −𝑟(𝑘 + 𝑐) to make exit worth considering, since 
the corresponding expected perpetuity value at that state would be equal to minus the exit costs 
−(𝑘 + 𝑐). 
The third term, 1/𝛽, is the least intuitive but can be interpreted as the optimal forbearance level. 
It reflects sophisticated rational behavior: given that re-entry is precluded, one should be willing to 
sustain some losses in the hope that the state improves again.6 Intuitively, the higher the variance 
of the benefits, the higher the possibility that a bad state turns around, and the more reluctant one 
should be to exit. This intuition is confirmed: since 
1
𝛽
= −√
𝜎2
2𝑟
, it is easy to show that 
𝜕𝑥𝑒
𝜕𝜎
< 0. 
Given (7) and (8), the continuation value at state 𝑥 is 
𝑉(𝑥) =
𝑥 + 𝜃
𝑟
−
𝑒𝛽(𝑥−𝑥
𝑒)
𝑟𝛽
 (9) 
As the state deteriorates to the optimal exit state, the continuation value converges to the cost 
of exit: lim
𝑥→𝑥𝑒
𝑉(𝑥) = −(𝑘 + 𝑐). The higher the cost of exit, the lower the value of the exit option 
and hence the continuation value: 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑘
=
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑐
< 0. Members prefer for themselves an exit penalty of 
𝑐 = 0. 
In summary, optimal exit decisions take into account the exit penalty 𝑐. The higher the penalty, 
the lower the optimal exit state. This is intuitive: the costlier exit, the worse things need to be before 
exit becomes an optimal decision. 
                                                 
6 In fact, even if re-entry is free one should be willing to sustain some losses before exiting (Dixit 1989). 
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Enforcement problems: the possibility of a secession war 
Up to now, we have assumed that any exit clause was fully binding. A member could only exit 
by paying the ex-ante agreed exit penalty 𝑐. However, given that federal constitutions are not 
enforced by supranational courts, exit clauses may not be fully binding. In particular, the members 
may decide to renegotiate, or a member wishing to exit may do so unilaterally. By secession war, 
we denote any unilateral exit which does not respect a pre-agreed exit clause or has not been 
negotiated. We model a secession war as a pair of costs (𝑤, 𝑑), where 𝑤 is the cost the exiting 
member would have to incur to win the secession war (including both the direct costs and the 
reputational costs) and 𝑑 is the corresponding damage to the remaining member.  
The direct costs of a secession war hinge on the relative ease of exerting military force over a 
federal entity’s territory. The stronger the presence of a loyal federal army within a federal entity, 
the more costly a secession war for that entity. Geography also plays a role: overseas regions or 
regions on the outer border of a federation incur less costs in seceding unilaterally than regions 
which are geographically contained within a federation. The reputational costs of a secession war 
depend both on the international norm against unilateral exit and on the circumstances. For 
instance, regions with oppressed ethnic minorities generally incur low reputational costs, as they 
tend to be quickly welcomed by the international community, i.e. recognized by other countries, 
the UN and the WTO (Buchanan 1997; Sorens 2016). For an analysis of third countries’ recognition 
strategies, see Coggins (2011). 
Arguably, if a member of the federation has the choice between using an exit clause and 
engaging in a secession war, it will pick the option with the lowest cost. Hence exit clauses with 
costs 𝑐 + 𝑘 above 𝑤 are ineffective as they cannot be enforced: the exit clause will never be used, 
but a secession war will occur if the state drops below 𝑥𝑒(𝑤) = −𝜃 − 𝑟𝑤 +
1
𝛽
 and a negotiated 
 14 
exit is not forthcoming. The higher the cost 𝑤, the less relevant the secession war option and hence 
the less severe the enforcement problem. 
The uncertainty of exit costs 
The model assumes that both the costs of exit per an exit clause, 𝑐 + 𝑘, and the cost of a 
secession war 𝑤 are certain. This assumption is not restrictive under two conditions: (1) the 
members of the federation are risk-neutral, and (2) no new information about these costs is released 
over time. If the members are not risk-neutral, the possible variance of the exit costs matters on top 
of their expected value. If new information about the exit costs becomes available over time7, the 
real options model would be complicated significantly but presumably the result would be that the 
optimal forbearance increases. If information is released over time it may become worthwhile, 
ceteris paribus, to postpone the exit decision a little longer to base the decision on a more precise 
estimate of the exit costs. 
The consequences of exit for the rest of the union 
Until now, we have only considered the member with exit option and dropped the index 𝑖, 
temporarily reducing our two-player model to a one-player model. We now reintroduce the index 
𝑖 for the member with the exit option, and introduce the index 𝑗 for the member subject to potential 
exit by member 𝑖. For 𝑗, the value 𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) of being in the union depends on both 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗: 𝑗’s 
benefit flow depends only on 𝑥𝑗, but will be stopped by 𝑖 depending on 𝑥𝑖.  
In the Appendix, we show that if only 𝑖 has an exit option, 𝑗’s value of being in the union is  
𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑟
+ (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗 −
𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑟
) 𝑒𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑖
𝑒) (10) 
                                                 
7 For instance by observing cases of other federal entities seceding unilaterally, as suggested by Walter (2006). 
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The first term again reflects the expected perpetuity value from the union, and is higher the 
higher 𝑗’s state 𝑥𝑗 and type 𝜃𝑗. The second term reflects the option value from 𝑖’s potential exit. 
This option value can be positive or negative; it is higher the higher the penalty 𝑐𝑖 that 𝑗 would 
receive, the lower 𝑗’s one-off costs 𝑘𝑗, and the lower 𝑗’s benefit flow 𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 that would be lost 
upon 𝑖’s exit. As 𝑖’s state deteriorates to its optimal exit state, 𝑗’s value function 𝑉𝑗 converges to 
the penalty it receives upon exit minus the one-off costs associated with exit: lim
𝑥𝑖→𝑥𝑖
𝑒
𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗.  
Given the initial state of the world 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0, the ex-ante expected value for 𝑗 is 𝑉𝑗(0,0) =
𝜃𝑗
𝑟
+ (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗 −
𝜃𝑗
𝑟
) 𝑒−𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑒
. The first order condition corresponding to the optimal exit penalty from 
𝑗’s perspective is (1 + 𝑟𝛽𝑖 (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗 −
𝜃𝑗
𝑟
)) 𝑒−𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑒
= 0. It is easy to verify that this penalty is 𝑐𝑖 =
𝜃𝑗
𝑟
+ 𝑘𝑗 −
1
𝑟𝛽𝑖
 and that it indeed corresponds to a maximum. This is the exit penalty preferred by 𝑗 
for the other member 𝑖. If only 𝑖 has an exit option, then 𝑗 would prefer for 𝑖’s exit penalty to be 
higher the higher 𝑗’s expected benefits, i.e. the higher 𝑗’s type 𝜃𝑗. Similarly, the higher 𝑗’s one-off 
costs, the higher 𝑗 would like 𝑖’s exit penalty to be. 
The possibility of an anti-secession war 
We have argued that federal unions may not be fully binding because of the possibility of a 
secession war and of a negotiated exit. A further enforcement problem is the possibility of an anti-
secession war. Even if the union includes an exit clause, a member trying to make legal use of this 
clause may be faced with an anti-secession war by the remaining member. Something to this effect 
occurred during the break-up of the Soviet Union, which tried preventing the secession of some 
Soviet republics. In the case of the American Civil War, some Southerners claimed there was an 
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implicit secession right and that hence the North was conducting an illegal anti-secession war 
(Buchanan, 1997: 36). 
Conducting an anti-secession war is an option for 𝑗 if 𝑖 has exercised its exit option. Intuitively, 
this option is more attractive for 𝑗 the worse off it would be by accepting 𝑖’s legal exit. From (10), 
accepting 𝑖’s exit is worse for 𝑗 the lower the penalty 𝑐𝑖 it would receive, the higher one-off costs 
𝑘𝑗, and the higher the lost benefit flow 𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗. While we omit a formal derivation it is clear that 
an attempt to prevent a legal exit militarily becomes more attractive for 𝑗 the lower the exit penalty 
𝑐𝑖 it would receive. Thus the possibility of an anti-secession war poses a lower limit on enforceable 
exit costs: if 𝑐𝑖 is too low, legal exit attempts by 𝑖 might be met by an anti-secession war conducted 
by 𝑗. 
The stronger the international norm against preventing legal secession, the higher the 
reputational cost of trying to prevent it and hence the less relevant the anti-secession war option as 
an enforcement problem. Because democracies tend to be more sensitive to reputational costs, anti-
secession wars may be only relevant in autocracies such as the Soviet Union. On this point, see the 
plenary debate on 25 April 2003 on the introduction of the EU’s withdrawal clause (now known as 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union). During the plenary, Mr. Roche from the Irish 
Government said “… it is worthwhile reminding the Convention that the former Soviets did have 
an exit clause, but if you chose to exercise it they would send gentlemen in tanks to talk to you”. 
Socially efficient exit 
In this section we study exit from the point of the entire union. In a union with two members, 
exit by one member leads to the end of the union. By deriving the impact of exit on the combined 
benefits of the two players 𝑥𝐶, we derive a condition for socially efficient exit. Taking the benefits 
of both members into account, this condition stipulates in which states of the world (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) the 
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union should be preserved, and in which states it should be terminated. To ease the exposition, we 
present the derivation of the socially efficient exit state as stemming from a social planner who has 
as an objective function the sum of the members’ benefits. 
We start by showing that if the benefit flows of both members are Brownian motions, then their 
combined benefit flow is also a Brownian motion. Recalling that the increments 𝜖𝐴𝑡 and 𝜖𝐵𝑡 of the 
Brownian motions 𝑥𝐴(𝑡) and 𝑥𝐵(𝑡) are jointly normally distributed for all 𝑡, the combined benefit 
flow 𝜋𝐶 can be written as 
𝜋𝐶(𝑡) = 𝜋𝐴(𝑡) + 𝜋𝐵(𝑡) = 𝑥𝐶(𝑡) + 𝜃𝐶 (11) 
where the combined state 𝑥𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑥𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑥𝐵(𝑡) and the combined type 𝜃𝐶 = 𝜃𝐴 + 𝜃𝐵. Using 
the definition of 𝑥𝐶, the increments 𝑑𝑥𝐶 = 𝜎𝐴𝜖𝐴𝑡√𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐵𝜖𝐵𝑡√𝑑𝑡 are normally distributed with 
variance 𝜎𝐶
2 = 𝜎𝐴
2 + 𝜎𝐵
2 + 2𝜌𝜎𝐴𝜎𝐵. The variance of the combined state is determined by the 
variances of the states of the members, and by their correlation 𝜌. 
The social planner’s continuation value is defined in terms of the Brownian motion 𝑥𝐶(𝑡). We 
show in the Appendix that the condition for socially efficient exit can be expressed in terms of 𝑥𝐴 
and 𝑥𝐵: 
𝑥𝐶 = 𝑥𝐶
𝑒 ⇔ 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐵 = −(𝜃𝐴 + 𝜃𝐵) − 𝑟𝑘𝐶 +
1
𝛽𝐶
 (12) 
Socially efficient exit requires taking into account the states of both members, as well as the 
total one-off costs of separation of 𝑘𝐶 = 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗 and the optimal forbearance level 1/𝛽𝐶. If the 
combined state 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐵 drops below the threshold specified in (12), terminating the union is 
socially efficient. Consistent with the notion of efficient breach presented in the introduction, 
socially efficient exit may require hurting one member if this benefits the other member more. If 
one member, say 𝐴, is in a good state (a high 𝑥𝐴), while 𝐵 is in a bad state (a low 𝑥𝐵), the socially 
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efficient exit decision is taken by adding up both states and comparing the result with the total one-
off costs of the separation 𝑘𝐴 + 𝑘𝐵. 
Substantively, the condition of a low joint state 𝑥𝐶 required for socially efficient exit can be 
fulfilled if heterogeneity has increased, or if the outside options of both players have improved 
simultaneously through an increase in free trade or peace. Elements that hurt one member while 
benefitting another, such as fiscal transfers, do not matter from this perspective. Similarly, from 
the social planner’s point of view, exit penalties are internal transfers and do not matter. However, 
as we have shown in (23) and (28) for the individual members exit penalties do matter. The higher 
the exit penalty 𝑐𝑖, the lower the state 𝑥𝑖
𝑒 at which member 𝑖 exits. In the next section, we show 
that the exit penalty 𝑐𝑖 can be defined so as to induce 𝑖 to make socially efficient exit decisions.  
State-contingent exit penalties 
In the Appendix, we derive 𝑖’s optimal exit behavior if the exit penalty can be made state-
contingent. We show that if the penalty is of the form 𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑗) = 𝑎𝑥𝑗 + 𝑏, then 𝑖 exits in states 
(𝑥𝑖
𝑒 , 𝑥𝑗
𝑒) satisfying 
𝑥𝑖
𝑒 + 𝑎𝑟𝑥𝑗
𝑒 = −𝜃𝑖 − 𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑘𝑖) +
1
𝜆𝑖
, 𝜆𝑖 = −√
2𝑟
𝜎𝑖
2 + 𝑎2𝑟2𝜎𝑗
2 + 2𝑎𝑟𝜌𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
 (13) 
For this condition to lead to socially efficient exit as in (12), one finds 𝑎 =
1
𝑟
, so that 𝜆𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 
and 𝑏 =
𝜃𝑗
𝑟
+ 𝑘𝑗. Hence the socially efficient exit penalty for 𝑖 is 
𝑐𝑖
∗ =
𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑟
+ 𝑘𝑗 (14) 
The higher the state of the other member 𝑥𝑗, the higher 𝑖’s exit cost should be to induce it to 
take socially efficient exit decisions. This is intuitive: the more member 𝑗 is enjoying the union, the 
higher should be 𝑖’s penalty for ending the union. Conversely, if member 𝑗 is in a very bad state, 
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member 𝑖 would receive a positive payment for ending the union. The second term of 𝑐𝑖
∗, equal to 
𝑘𝑗, reflects that for socially efficient exit 𝑖 needs to be incentivized to take 𝑗’s one-off costs of 𝑖’s 
exit into account. 
Under the socially efficient exit penalty 𝑐𝑖
∗, 𝑖’s option value coincides with the social planner’s 
option value: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖
∗ ⇒ 𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑟
−
𝑒𝛽𝐶(𝑥𝑐−𝑥𝐶
𝑒)
𝑟𝛽
, 𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑟
 (15) 
This is because 𝑖 has the same costs and benefits from stopping the union as the social planner: 
the payment of 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗, and the loss of the perpetuity value 
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑖
𝑟
. The loss of 𝑥𝑖/𝑟 is direct: by 
stopping the union, 𝑖 stops its benefit flow. The loss of 𝑥𝑗/𝑟 is indirect: the socially efficient exit 
penalty requires that 𝑖 pay 𝑥𝑗/𝑟 to 𝑗. 
Optimal exit in a game-theoretical setting 
In the previous section, we formally analyzed the case where only one member had an exit 
option. In this section, we discuss exit in a game-theoretical setting. If both members have an exit 
option, member 𝑖’s optimal exit strategy will depend on member 𝑗’s exit strategy and vice versa. 
In such a setting, no analytical solutions are available because the exit options are no longer 
perpetual: member 𝑖’s (stochastic) exit time is the expiration date of member 𝑗’s exit option. In 
addition, the analysis in this setting depends crucially on the possibility of a negotiated exit, which 
is hard to formalize appropriately. 
If there are no obstacles to negotiating exit, socially efficient exit occurs irrespective of a 
potential exit clause. Although in this case the conditions of the exit clause do not matter for the 
timing of exit, the exit costs stipulated in the exit clause may affect the side-payments made to 
forestall or obtain exit, similar to the distribution of property rights in Coase (1960). 
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In reality many obstacles may limit the scope for negotiating exit. Politicians or voters may be 
loss-averse or boundedly rational. Moreover, transfers may be costly or members’ states may be 
privately observed (Fearon 1995). The importance of such impediments to a negotiated exit is 
ultimately an empirical matter. But because these impediments are hard to measure, we prefer not 
to formally model the role of negotiated exit and provide a discussion instead. 
If negotiating exit is not frictionless, the possibility of an inefficient secession war reemerges, 
and with it the scope for exit clauses to improve social welfare. In particular, setting the exit cost 
𝑐𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖 equal to the cost of a secession war 𝑤𝑖 would be welfare enhancing: when 𝑖’s state drops 
to 𝑥𝑖
𝑒(𝑤𝑖), it will pay the penalty 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖 to 𝑗, instead of starting a secession war which costs 
𝑑𝑗 to 𝑗. If the state of the world is fully contractible, efficiency could be further increased in the 
absence of renegotiation by making member 𝑖’s exit cost conditional on 𝑗’s state as in (15). 
However, since the lack of observability of 𝑗’s state by 𝑖 may precisely be one of the impediments 
to a negotiated exit, it seems optimistic to assume that state-contingent exit clauses could fully 
restore social efficiency. 
To conclude this section we summarize the predictions of our theory based on the decision 
theoretical model and our discussion of negotiated exit. We identified three potential modes of exit: 
ex-post negotiation, unilateral exit, and exit based on an ex-ante agreed exit clause. If both members 
of a union are benefitting from it (are in a good state), neither will consider exit. Hence in states of 
the world (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) where both 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 are high the union continues. If both 𝑖 and 𝑗 are in a bad 
state, i.e. 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 are both low, exit will be negotiated and the union is dissolved. 
If 𝑖 is in a bad state (low 𝑥𝑖) while 𝑗 is in a good state (high 𝑥𝑗), 𝑖’s decision whether to exit 
depends on the exit costs of its cheapest mode of exit. If there is an exit clause, the associated exit 
costs consist of the penalty 𝑐𝑖 and the one-off costs 𝑘𝑖. The costs of unilateral exit (secession war) 
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are 𝑤. The higher 𝑖’s exit costs and the lower the variance 𝜎𝑖, the lower the state 𝑥𝑖 can drop until 
exit becomes optimal for 𝑖. If there are no barriers to ex-post negotiation, exit occurs when it is 
socially efficient, i.e. when the combined benefits of both members drop below a critical level. The 
side-payment made for such a negotiated exit depends on 𝑖’s exit costs, and on 𝑗’s costs of an anti-
secession war. If 𝑖 faces low exit costs and 𝑗 high anti-secession costs, 𝑗 makes a side-payment to 
𝑖 for staying in the union. If a negotiated exit is not possible because dissolving the union would 
not be efficient (i.e. 𝑗 is benefitting more from the union than 𝑖 is losing), or because of barriers to 
negotiation, then 𝑖 considers unilateral exit. 
Empirical evidence 
In this section we derive testable hypotheses from our analysis. We focus on hypotheses that 
have to our knowledge not been tested yet in the literature. The lack of previous testing for these 
hypotheses is likely due to difficulties with gathering the necessary data. We provide a first stab 
by analyzing the breakup of Yugoslavia. Since the number of federations with exit clauses is very 
small, we are also able to test our hypotheses related to exit clauses for all cases known to us of 
federal exit clauses. While the evidence is supportive of the predictions of our model, it is by nature 
inconclusive in any statistical sense due to the small number of cases. 
Testable hypotheses 
The theory presented in this article centers on four key concepts: (1) the net benefits of being 
in the union versus outside, (2) the costs of unilateral secession through a secession war, (3) the 
presence of an exit clause and the associated exit costs, and (4) the costs of an anti-secession war. 
In particular, the theory predicts that exit will occur if a member’s net benefits drops below a critical 
value defined by the exit costs of the cheapest available mode of exit, whether it be a negotiated 
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exit, exit based on an exit clause, or a secession war. Each of the four key concepts is defined by 
several components.  
First, the net benefits of being in the union depend on economies of scale, fiscal transfers, and 
welfare losses from centralized decision-making in the presence of heterogeneity. Many 
hypotheses related to these components have been tested elsewhere. Desmet et al. (2011) find 
support for the importance of economies of scale as proxied by population, for transfers as proxied 
by GDP per capita, and for cultural heterogeneity as proxied by genetic distances. However, to the 
best of our knowledge the direct effect of transfers has not been tested so far. Since economic 
development may have other effects beyond causing fiscal transfers, the following hypothesis is 
still open for testing: 
H1: Federal entities paying fiscal transfers to the rest of the federation are more likely to 
secede. 
Because the benefits of the federation are defined versus the outside option, changes in the 
outside options also influence the net benefits. Since international organizations can provide 
economies of scale in defense or market size, this leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The outside availability of membership of international organizations increases the 
likelihood of secession. 
Second, predictions of the model depend on the costs of unilateral secession through a secession 
war. We argued that a secession war has direct costs and reputation costs. The direct costs of a 
secession war hinge on the relative ease of exerting military force over a federal entity’s territory, 
as determined by relative military capacity and geography. The role of geographical isolation in 
promoting unilateral secession has been confirmed in the literature (Sorens 2012). The reputational 
 23 
costs of a secession war depend on the stance of the international community, leading to the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: Positive (negative) declarations by third countries regarding recognition increase 
(decrease) the likelihood of unilateral secession. 
Third, and this is our main contribution, our model takes into account the possibility of exit 
clauses. The costs of exit based on an exit clause are assumed to consist of one-off costs and exit 
penalties. Because there are no cases on record of federations with exit penalties, hypotheses related 
to the costs of using an exit clause can only be tested after developing an adequate measure of one-
off costs. A more general prediction related to exit clauses that can be tested directly is:  
H4: Exit clauses can enable peaceful secession even if there are barriers to ex-post 
renegotiation. 
Finally, we concluded that in response to the triggering of an exit clause, the rump of the 
federation may start an anti-secession war. However, since trying to prevent an exit clause-based 
secession carries reputational costs, we argued that anti-secession wars may only be relevant in 
autocracies, leading to the following testable hypothesis: 
H5: Democracies never meet an exit clause-based secession with an anti-secession war. 
The breakup of Yugoslavia 
After World War II, Josip Broz Tito united Yugoslavia as a Socialist Federal Republic 
consisting of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia (Lampe, 2000: 233-235). In 1974, a confederal constitution was adopted (Fine, 2003: 
182). While the preamble of this constitution made a reference to a national right to self-
determination, Article 5 stated that border changes required the consent of all republics and 
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provinces (Iglar, 1992: 219). The 1974 constitution hence did not have an exit clause in any real 
sense. 
In 1980 the Yugoslav President Tito died. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and over the 
period 1990-1991 the Soviet Union disintegrated. In June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally 
declared their independence from Yugoslavia, and by the end of the year Macedonia did the same 
(Hupchick & Cox, 2001: 49). Serbia, controlled by Milošević and considered the dominant republic 
in the Yugoslav federation, was opposed. In Slovenia, fighting only lasted ten days and its 
independence was quickly recognized. In Croatia, more fighting took place before its independence 
was conceded. There was no resistance against Macedonia’s independence. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, a three-way war erupted between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
declared its independence in March 1992. 
The two remaining republics in rump Yugoslavia, Montenegro and Serbia, proclaimed the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1992. In 1995 the Dayton agreement was signed to restore 
peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in 1996 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognized Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia renamed itself the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro. Article 60 of the new constitution stipulated that either state could declare its 
independence after a three year waiting period. In 2006, Montenegro declared its independence 
after the referendum of 21 May 2006 showed 55.5% of the voters to be in favor. Montenegro was 
admitted to the UN in June 2006 as its 192th member state.  
In February 2008, the Serbian autonomous region of Kosovo proclaimed its independence. In 
an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice found that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence did not violate international law (ICJ 2010). Serbia has not officially recognized 
Kosovo, but in 2013 the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo accepted to normalize relations in 
the so-called Brussels Agreement mediated by the EU’s High Representative Catherine Ashton. 
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Based on the breakup of Yugoslavia, H1 clearly still stands. Croatia and Slovenia, the first 
republics to declare independence, were not only economically more advanced, but they were 
indeed paying transfers to the rest of Yugoslavia (Fine, 2003: 182). One key mechanism for such 
transfers was the Yugoslav Federal Fund, which provided investment capital for the less developed 
regions (Bookman, 1993: 97). Hence in terms of fiscal transfers Croatia and Slovenia were on the 
losing side of the federation. Once the rich republics Croatia and Slovenia had seceded, the transfers 
they provided stopped. This may explain why it then became beneficial for the poorer regions of 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to secede as well. 
The facts of the Yugoslavian breakup are also consistent with H2. With the adoption of the 
Single European Act in 1986, the European single market became a tempting outside option for 
the more developed republics Croatia and Slovenia; Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 and Croatia in 
2013. A similar observation holds for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During the 
Cold War, Yugoslavia had a policy of non-alignment, while outside of Yugoslavia, independent 
republics were free to seek membership of NATO. Slovenia joined NATO in 2004 and Croatia in 
2009. 
Regarding the costs of a secession war, H3 is also corroborated by the Yugoslav case. Germany 
clearly played a role in lowering the reputation costs of unilateral secession by promising to 
recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia (Dragovic-Soso, 2008: 23). Conversely, US 
policy played a role in increasing the reputational cost of the Kosovo secession. Indeed, in spite of 
condemning Serb violence, the US for a long time “insisted that Kosovo should remain within 
Serbia” (Fine, 2003: 187). 
Regarding H4, there was no exit clause available to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia or Kosovo so they all seceded unilaterally – resulting in violence in Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. By contrast, in 2006 Montenegro used the exit clause that was 
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entered in the constitution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Montenegro 
respected the waiting period of three years and Serbia accepted the independence peacefully. The 
fact that the exit clause was called just shortly after the stipulated three-year waiting period is 
suggestive that exit clauses really can have a binding role in enabling peaceful secession, and 
corroborates H4. The fact that Serbia peacefully accepted Montenegro’s exit clause-based 
secession also corroborates H5. 
The evidence on exit clauses 
As indicated in the introduction very few federations have exit clauses. We provide an overview 
of all cases known to us in Table 1.  
Table 1. Overview of federations with exit clauses. 
 No exit so far Peaceful exit Anti-secession war 
Democracies European Union 
Saint Kitts & Nevis 
Montenegro / 
Autocracies Ethiopia South Sudan Soviet Union 
 
In the European Union and Saint Kitts & Nevis no exit has occurred so far.8 Although the UK 
has started the process of leaving the EU, none of the other member states has suggested meeting 
the UK’s potential exit with military force, corroborating H5. In Ethiopia, the 1991 constitution 
permitting secession was adopted after the collapse of military rule and the start of Eritrea’s 
independence process. However, scholars are pessimistic about the secession clause, corroborating 
H5: “The provisions of a liberal democratic constitution conflict with the reality of authoritarian 
centralist practice and therefore jeopardize the future of federalism. Although the secession clause 
                                                 
8 On June 23, 2016 the United Kingdom (UK) organized a non-binding referendum on EU membership. The 
majority voted to leave, and the UK government triggered Article 50 on March 29, 2017. 
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has symbolic value, it is unlikely that any Ethiopian government would allow secession to take 
place” (Habtu, 2005: 313). 
As discussed, Montenegro’s peaceful exit clause-based secession corroborates H4. Another 
confirmatory case is the 2011 independence of South Sudan from Sudan after the 2005 peace 
agreement. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the Second Sudanese Civil War 
which ran from 1983 to 2005 between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army located in the South of the country. The peace treaty stipulated that the South would have 
autonomy for 6 years, and that oil revenues would be split equally during this period. The period 
of autonomy would be followed by an independence referendum in 2011. In the referendum, 98.8% 
voted in favor of independence, and South Sudan declared its independence. 
Importantly, H4 does not imply that exit clauses are necessary for peaceful secession, since in 
the absence of barriers to renegotiation secession can be negotiated. Examples that come to mind 
of such peacefully negotiated secessions are the “velvet divorce” of Czechoslovakia (1993), and 
the independence of Norway from Sweden (1905).  
Considering Table 1, H5 states that the top right cell should be empty. For the limited number 
of federations with exit clauses, this hypothesis stands: democracies have never met an exit clause-
based secession with an anti-secession war. Conversely, the case of the Soviet Union’s dissolution 
makes clear that in autocracies secession may be violent even with exit clauses. 
Conclusion 
We presented a political economic analysis of secession and exit clauses in federations. In our 
model, a member’s benefits from a political union are determined by its type and its state. Because 
of changes in the state of the world, a member’s benefits may go up or down. Mathematically, we 
assumed that the state of each member follows a Brownian motion. If a member’s benefits become 
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negative, i.e. it is in a low state, it may wish to exit. Using real options theory, we derived a 
member’s optimal exit state. Three factors determine the optimal exit state. The higher a member’s 
type, the higher exit costs, and the higher the variance of benefits, the lower the state can drop until 
it becomes optimal to exit.  
Exit costs depend on the mode of exit. If a federation has an exit clause, exit can occur on the 
basis of such a clause. Exit clauses can contain several conditions, among which we focused on 
exit penalties. If the costs of exit according to the exit clause are low, and it occurs while other 
members are benefitting a lot from the union, those other members may try to prevent exit 
forcefully through an anti-secession war – as happened in the Soviet Union. However, such 
attempted prevention of legal exit carries heavy reputational costs, especially for democracies. If 
there is no exit clause, or the exit cost is high, exit may occur unilaterally. The costs of such 
unilateral exit consist of tangible costs (such as military expenses) and reputational costs (which 
depend on the international recognition of the exit). A third mode of exit is through ex-post 
negotiation, although this can be expected to be difficult because of frictions to negotiations. 
When a member exits, the benefits for the other members of that member being in the union 
are also stopped. From a social efficiency perspective, exit should occur if and only if it generates 
value taking all members’ benefits into account: this is the principle of efficient breach in contract 
law. Based on a real options model, we showed that appropriate state-contingent exit penalties can 
ex-ante enable efficient breach if there are barriers to renegotiation. If exit penalties cannot be made 
state-contingent, fixed exit penalties can still increase social welfare by avoiding secession wars. 
These findings run counter to the dominant point of view in the constitutionalist literature that exit 
clauses should be avoided in federations. 
By analyzing the breakup of Yugoslavia and all known cases of federations with exit clauses, 
we found support for five hypotheses derived from our model that have not been directly tested in 
 29 
the literature. First, federal entities paying fiscal transfers to the rest of the federation are more 
likely to secede. Second, the outside availability of membership of international organizations 
increases the likelihood of secession. Third, positive declarations by third countries regarding 
recognition increase the likelihood of unilateral secession. Fourth, exit clauses can enable peaceful 
secession even if there are barriers to ex-post renegotiation. Fifth, democracies never meet an exit 
clause-based secession with an anti-secession war. While the evidence is supportive of the 
predictions of our model, it is by nature inconclusive in any statistical sense due to the small number 
of cases, and future empirical research is needed. 
Our results beg the question why exit clauses are not more prevalent in real-world federations. 
We tentatively advance three reasons. First, politicians negotiating federations may wish to tie their 
successors’ hands. In our model, we assumed that each member of the political union could be 
represented as a unitary actor. In practice, political unions may have heterogeneous effects on 
different parts of the population within one member. If that is the case, politicians whose electorate 
favors the union may want to prevent exit in the future by not having an exit clause.  
Second, political unions may not be rationally designed. This may be especially true for long-
established federal countries. But even for modern federations there may be a norm against exit 
clauses because these are perceived as going against the spirit of collaboration embedded in such 
unions. Such a norm may also explain why most real-world examples of exit clauses (such as the 
EU’s Article 50) have no exit penalties, in spite of the theoretical importance of exit costs to achieve 
socially efficient exit decisions. 
Third, exit clauses may not be prevalent in the real world because powerful members of the 
federation may be able to impose their terms. Given favorable substantive terms of the union, they 
would expect to benefit a lot from being in it. In turn, this would lead them to prefer a high exit 
cost for the other members. Expecting to be able to easily negotiate exit if the union would ever 
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stop being beneficial to them, they may prefer not having an exit clause altogether and successfully 
impose this. 
We leave for future research the negotiation of exit clauses. Given the distributional 
implications of exit clauses, the bargaining process will be important and socially efficient exit 
clauses are not guaranteed. However, to the extent that members are negotiating behind a veil of 
ignorance, their ex-ante preferences will be closer to the social optimum and negotiations will be 
easier. A second area for future research is to make the link between the state of the world and 
payoffs endogenous. In the model presented here, the payoff-relevant state of the world is 
exogenous. In practice members may be able to change how the state of the world affects their 
payoffs by renegotiating the terms of the union. For instance, federal laws affect how the state of 
the world maps to federal transfers and hence to the benefits from the union. If at some point the 
prevailing transfers make the federation undesirable to a member, this member will likely try to 
renegotiate the federal laws before considering exit. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of the continuation value 
At any point in time, in order for a member to be willing to maintain the union for 𝑑𝑡 longer, 
the expected change in the continuation value combined with the benefit flow (1) over 𝑑𝑡 should 
add up to the normal return 𝑟𝑉(𝑥)𝑑𝑡: 
𝐸[𝑑𝑉] + (𝑥 + 𝜃)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑟𝑉(𝑥)𝑑𝑡 (16) 
Determining the continuation value is just like pricing a stock with expected appreciation 
𝐸[𝑑𝑉] and dividend flow 𝑥 + 𝜃. By Ito’s lemma, 𝑑𝑉 =
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑡
𝑑𝑡 +
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑥 +
1
2
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑥2
(𝑑𝑥)2; see Øksendal 
(1991) for the theory of stochastic differential equations and a discussion of Ito’s lemma. The 
benefit flow does not depend on calendar time directly: 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑡
= 0. Together with (2), 𝐸[𝑑𝑥] = 0 and 
𝐸[(𝑑𝑥𝑖)
2] = 𝜎𝑖
2𝑑𝑡, this implies 
𝑑𝑉 = 𝑉′(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +
1
2
𝑉′′(𝑥)𝜎2𝜖𝑡
2𝑑𝑡 ⇒  𝐸[𝑑𝑉] =
1
2
𝑉′′(𝑥)𝜎2𝑑𝑡 (17) 
By substituting (17) in (16), we find 
1
2
𝜎2𝑉′′(𝑥) − 𝑟𝑉(𝑥) = −𝑥 − 𝜃 (18) 
This is a second order differential equation in 𝑥: we solve it by first identifying the solution 
𝑉ℎ(𝑥) of the homogeneous equation 
1
2
𝜎2𝑉′′(𝑥) − 𝑟𝑉(𝑥) = 0. Next we identify a particular 
solution 𝑉𝑝(𝑥) which satisfies the equation 
1
2
𝜎2𝑉′′(𝑥) − 𝑟𝑉(𝑥) = −𝑥 − 𝜃. The general solution is 
given by the particular solution plus any linear combination of solutions to the homogeneous 
equation. For the homogeneous part, we try a solution of the form 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑒𝜆𝑥. This yields 
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𝑉ℎ(𝑥) = 𝐴𝑒
𝛼𝑥 + 𝐵𝑒𝛽𝑥 , 𝛼 = √
2𝑟
𝜎2
, 𝛽 = −√
2𝑟
𝜎2
 (19) 
with constants 𝐴 and 𝐵 to be identified. Note that 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 = −𝛼 < 0. For a particular 
solution, we try 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏. This yields the solution 𝑉𝑝(𝑥) =
𝑥+𝜃
𝑟
. This is the expected 
perpetuity value from the union starting from state 𝑥. Combining the particular solution with the 
homogeneous part, the general solution is 
𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑉𝑝(𝑥) + 𝑉ℎ(𝑥) =
𝑥 + 𝜃
𝑟
+  𝐴𝑒𝛼𝑥 + 𝐵𝑒𝛽𝑥 (20) 
Since 𝑉𝑝(𝑥) represents the value from maintaining the union perpetually, 𝑉ℎ(𝑥) represents the 
option value of exit, which should be positive. As the state improves, the value of the exit option 
should converge to 0: the better the state, the higher your benefit flow and the less valuable the exit 
option. This implies that 𝐴 = 0 since 𝛼 > 0. We now have an expression for the continuation value 
𝑉(𝑥) up to the constant 𝐵. This constant will be determined by a boundary condition corresponding 
to optimal exit. 
Optimal exit with a penalty 𝑐 
Two conditions are needed for optimal exit in a continuous time stochastic model (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994). The first is Value Matching (VM): exit should occur when 𝑉(𝑥) drops to the value 
of the outside option. In our model, the outside option consists of paying the one-off costs and the 
penalty 𝑐, which corresponds to a value of −𝑘 − 𝑐. The second condition is Smooth Pasting (SP): 
optimal stopping requires that 𝑉′(𝑥) be equal to the derivative of the value of being outside of the 
union – which is 0 in our case, since the exit value does not depend on the state. Grouping the two 
conditions we obtain a system with two equations and two unknowns (𝑥𝑒 , 𝐵): 
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𝑉(𝑥𝑒) = −𝑘 − 𝑐 ⇔
𝑥𝑒 + 𝜃
𝑟
+ 𝐵𝑒𝛽𝑥
𝑒
= −𝑘 − 𝑐 VM (21) 
𝑉′(𝑥𝑒) = 0 ⇔
1
𝑟
+ 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝛽𝑥
𝑒
= 0 SP (22) 
The solutions for (𝑥𝑒, 𝐵) are 
𝑥𝑒 = −𝜃 − 𝑟(𝑘 + 𝑐) +
1
𝛽
, 𝐵 = −
𝑒−𝛽𝑥
𝑒
𝑟𝛽
 (23) 
The value function of a member without exit option 
Just like (16), over an infinitesimal period 𝑑𝑡 the expected change in value combined with the 
benefit flow should add up to the normal return 𝑟𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗)𝑑𝑡: 
𝐸[𝑑𝑉𝑗] + (𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑟𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗)𝑑𝑡 (24) 
Ito’s lemma in two dimensions (Øksendal 1991) gives 
𝑑𝑉𝑗 =
𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑡
𝑑𝑡 +
𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖 +
𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝑑𝑥𝑗
+
1
2
[
𝜕2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖
2 (𝑑𝑥𝑖)
2 +
𝜕2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
2 (𝑑𝑥𝑗)
2
+ 2
𝜕2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑗] 
(25) 
Now, since 𝑉𝑗 is time-independent and using the properties of the Brownian motions 𝑥𝐴 and 
𝑥𝐵, 𝐸[𝑑𝑉𝑗] =
1
2
𝑑𝑡 [𝜎𝑖
2 𝜕
2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑗
2 𝜕
2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
2 + 2𝜌𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
𝜕2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
]. Fill this out in (24) to obtain the partial 
differential equation 
1
2
[𝜎𝑖
2
𝜕2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑗
2
𝜕2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
2 + 2𝜌𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
𝜕2𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
] + 𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 = 𝑟𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) (26) 
If 𝑖 exits, 𝑗 receives the exit penalty 𝑐 and incurs one-off cost 𝑘𝑗. Since 𝑖 will exit at 𝑥𝑖
𝑒 = −𝜃𝑖 −
𝑟(𝑘𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖) +
1
𝛽𝑖
, the appropriate value-matching condition is 
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∀𝑥𝑗:  𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖
𝑒, 𝑥𝑗) = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗 VM (27) 
Since 𝑗 undergoes 𝑖’s exit decision, there is no smooth-pasting condition for optimality. The 
solution for 𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) needs to satisfy both the partial differential equation (26) and the value-
matching condition VM (27). The general solution of (26) consists of a particular solution and any 
linear combination of solutions to the homogeneous equation. A particular solution is again 
𝑉𝑗𝑝(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑗+𝜃𝑗
𝑟
, the perpetuity value of the union.  
If the Brownian motions are uncorrelated and 𝜌 = 0, then the partial differential equation is 
separable and analytical solutions can be obtained for the homogeneous equation as well. As 
before, one solution for the homogeneous equation is 𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖 with 𝛽𝑖 = −√
2𝑟
𝜎𝑖
2. Since the particular 
solution 𝑉𝑗𝑝 =
𝑥𝑗+𝜃𝑗
𝑟
 contains 𝑥𝑗 but VM (27) does not, we should identify a solution for the 
homogeneous equation which also contains 𝑥𝑗. One can verify that 𝑥𝑗𝑒
𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖 is such a solution. 
Combining the particular solution with the two solutions of the homogeneous problem, we get 
𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑗+𝜃𝑗
𝑟
+ 𝐶𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝐷𝑥𝑗𝑒
𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖. Using VM (27), 𝐶 = (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗 −
𝜃𝑗
𝑟
) 𝑒−𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑒
 and 𝐷 =
−
𝑒−𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑒
𝑟
, so that 
𝑉𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑟
+ (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗 −
𝑥𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑟
) 𝑒𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑖
𝑒) (28) 
Socially efficient exit 
At the time of exit, the members incur the one-off costs 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑘𝑗. From the social planner’s 
point of view, any penalty 𝑐𝑖 is a pure transfer from 𝑖 to 𝑗 and does not play a role when considering 
the union as a whole. Hence the social value of exit is −𝑘𝐶 = −(𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗). The value-matching and 
smooth-pasting conditions are 
 38 
𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐶
𝑒) = −2𝑘 ⇔
𝑥𝐶
𝑒 + 𝜃𝐶
𝑟
+ 𝐵𝑒𝛽𝐶𝑥𝐶
𝑒
= −𝑘𝐶 VM (29) 
𝑉𝐶
′(𝑥𝐶
𝑒) = 0 ⇔
1
𝑟
+ 𝛽𝐶𝐵𝑒
𝛽𝐶𝑥𝐶
𝑒
= 0 SP (30) 
Resulting in the socially efficient exit state 𝑥𝐶
𝑒 = −𝜃𝐶 − 𝑟𝑘𝐶 +
1
𝛽𝐶
 with 𝛽𝐶 = −√
2𝑟
𝜎𝐴
2+𝜎𝐵
2+2𝜌𝜎𝐴𝜎𝐵
. 
The condition for socially efficient exit can be expressed in terms of the underlying states 𝑥𝐴 and 
𝑥𝐵: 
𝑥𝐶 = 𝑥𝐶
𝑒 ⇔ 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐵 = −(𝜃𝐴 + 𝜃𝐵) − 𝑟𝑘𝐶 +
1
𝛽𝐶
 (31) 
State-contingent exit penalties 
If the penalty 𝑐𝑖 can be made state-contingent, then 𝑖’s continuation value will depend on 𝑥𝑗. 
Assume only 𝑖 has an exit option but the exit cost 𝑐𝑖 is a function of 𝑥𝑗, specifically 
𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑗) = 𝑎𝑥𝑗 + 𝑏 (32) 
As in (16), in order for 𝑖 to stay in the union for 𝑑𝑡 longer at state (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗), the expected change 
in continuation value combined with the benefit flow should add up to the normal return 
𝑟𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗)𝑑𝑡 
𝐸[𝑑𝑉𝑖] + (𝑥𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑟𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗)𝑑𝑡 (33) 
Ito’s lemma in two dimensions gives 
𝑑𝑉𝑖 =
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑡
𝑑𝑡 +
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖 +
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝑑𝑥𝑗
+
1
2
[
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
2 (𝑑𝑥𝑖)
2 +
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗
2 (𝑑𝑥𝑗)
2
+ 2
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑗] 
(34) 
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Now, since 𝑉𝑖 is time-independent and using the properties of the Brownian motions 𝑥𝐴 and 
𝑥𝐵, 𝐸[𝑑𝑉] =
1
2
𝑑𝑡 [𝜎𝑖
2 𝜕
2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑗
2 𝜕
2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗
2 + 2𝜌𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
]. Fill this out in (33) to obtain the partial 
differential equation 
1
2
[𝜎𝑖
2 𝜕
2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑗
2 𝜕
2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗
2 + 2𝜌𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
] + 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 = 𝑟𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) (35) 
As in the main text, a particular solution is 𝑉𝑝(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑖+𝜃𝑖
𝑟
, the perpetuity value of the union. 
For the homogeneous part, which corresponds to the option value of exit, try 𝑉ℎ(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑒𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖+𝜆𝑗𝑥𝑗 to obtain 
𝜎𝑖
2𝜆𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑗
2𝜆𝑗
2 + 2𝜌𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑗 = 2𝑟 (36) 
This gives 𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑖+𝜃𝑖
𝑟
+ 𝐶𝑒𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖+𝜆𝑗𝑥𝑗 with 𝐶 to be determined and 𝜆𝑖 , 𝜆𝑗 satisfying (36). 
Since upon exit 𝑖 has to pay the penalty 𝑐(𝑥𝑗) = 𝑎𝑥𝑗 + 𝑏 and incurs the one-off cost 𝑘𝑖, the 
value-matching condition at an exit state 𝑥𝑒 = (𝑥𝑖
𝑒 , 𝑥𝑗
𝑒) is 
𝑉(𝑥𝑒) = −𝑐(𝑥𝑗
𝑒) − 𝑘𝑖 ⇔
𝑥𝑖
𝑒 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑟
+ 𝐶𝑒𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑒+𝜆𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑒
= −𝑐(𝑥𝑗
𝑒) − 𝑘𝑖 VM (37) 
There are two smooth-pasting conditions because 𝑖 should take both 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 into account 
when thinking about exit. The penalty does not depend on 𝑥𝑖, but it does depend on 𝑥𝑗, so that 
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
(𝑥𝑒) = 0 ⇔
1
𝑟
+ 𝐶𝜆𝑖𝑒
𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑒+𝜆𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑒
= 0 
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗
(𝑥𝑒) = −
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑥𝑗
⇔ 𝐶𝜆𝑗𝑒
𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑒+𝜆𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑒
= −𝑎 
SP (38) 
Combining conditions (36), VM (37) and SP (38), one finds 
𝜆𝑖 = −√
2𝑟
𝜎𝑖
2 + 𝑎2𝑟2𝜎𝑗
2 + 2𝑎𝑟𝜌𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
, 𝜆𝑗 = 𝑎𝑟𝜆𝑖 (39) 
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Filling this out, one finds that optimal exit for 𝑖 is defined in terms of the following linear 
combination of 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 
𝑥𝑖
𝑒 + 𝑎𝑟𝑥𝑗
𝑒 = −𝜃𝑖 − 𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑘𝑖) +
1
𝜆𝑖
  (40) 
The higher 𝑎 or the more 𝑐𝑖 is made contingent on 𝑥𝑗, the higher the weight of 𝑥𝑗 in 𝑖’s exit 
decision. Member 𝑖’s continuation value depends on its own state 𝑥𝑖 for the perpetuity value, and 
on the linear combination of 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 for the option value 
𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑟
−
𝑒𝜆𝑖[(𝑥𝑖+𝑎𝑟𝑥𝑗)−(𝑥𝑖
𝑒+𝑎𝑟𝑥𝑗
𝑒)]
𝑟𝜆𝑖
 (41) 
It is easy to verify that with a non-state contingent exit penalty 𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑗) = 𝑐, i.e. 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 𝑐, 
the solution reduces to non-state contingent solution presented in the main text. 
 
 
 
 
